Security analysis of network protocols is a rich scientific area with two different foundations, one based on logic and symbolic computation, and one based on computational complexity theory. The symbolic approach has led to formal logics and automated tools that have been used successfully in a number of case studies. The computational approach yields more insight into the strength and vulnerabilities of protocols, but it involves explicit reasoning about probability and computational complexity. Ideally, we would like to combine the advantages of both and develop a simple, automatable method that captures intuitive high-level reasoning principles, yet accurately reflects the subtleties of probabilistic polynomial-time computation. This talk will summarize some of the main lines of prior work and discuss ways to bridge the gap between symbolic and computational analysis. A significant portion of the talk will focus on a high-level protocol logic whose provable statements are correct when regarded as assertions about probabilistic polynomial-time protocol execution in the face of probabilistic polynomial-time attack.
SUMMARY
This invited talk will describe case studies on specific network protocols and methods used in protocol analysis. The main topic will be the relationship between symbolic methods and computational properties of protocols and attacks. Some example protocol studies include Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [21] , Internet Key Exchange (IKE) and related protocols [9, 10] , contract signing protocols [24, 6, 3] , and the 802.11i wireless networking standard [15, 16] . Some methods used in these and other studies are finite-state analysis using Murϕ [22] , a multiset-rewriting execution model [5, 13] , and an approach using a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus [23, 12] .
After summarizing some of the main approaches developed by our group at Stanford and by other researchers, this talk will focus on our Protocol Composition Logic [3, 9, 11, 14] . While originally formulated as a logic for reasoning about a simplified symbolic protocol semantics, we have recently investigated connections between this logic and the form of probabilistic polynomial-time execution model commonly used in cryptographic studies. A companion paper appears in the proceedings of the ICALP meeting held contemporaneously and co-located with the 2005 PPDP conference [8] .
As mentioned in [8] , several other groups of researchers have either formulated connections between symbolic logic and feasible probabilistic computation, or developed relationships between symbolic and computational models. In particular, Abadi and Rogaway [1] propose a logical characterization of indistinguishability by passive eavesdroppers that has been studied by a number of others (e.g., [2] ), and Kapron and Impagliazzo suggest a formal logic for reasoning about probabilistic polynomial-time indistinguishability [19] . Some semantic connections between symbolic and computational models have been developed by the team at IBM Zurich, e.g., [4] , with other connections explored in a series of papers by Micciancio, Warinschi, and collaborators [20, 25, 7] . Herzog [17, 18] shows that if a protocol attack exists in a symbolic model, there is an attack in a computational model.
